

The following CONCEPT draft is also embryo
to Introduction for ensuing ed. volume:

The Third Edmund Mokrzycki Symposium will take place 20-21 October 2006. It will become a natural continuation of the previous ones, now when the European family will adopt more members, probably letting Bulgaria and Romania join already in 2007 or 2008.

Does Europe need a core? Where does Europe end? Will Russia ever fit in? What about Serbia and Turkey? Or what about Neighbouring Christian countries in the so called “Near East”, such as Georgia and Armenia? This is the sort of questions the Third symposium will address.

The First Edmund Mokrzycki symposium in late September 2002 became an eulogy over transitology, with the teleological dimension that concept implies. Nowadays we speak of transformations; there are multiple routes to Modernity, which moreover could be filled with varying content. It might be argued that also the concept of transformation has teleological overtones. Modernity rather than liberal capitalism is implied goal. However, the recent notion of Multiple Modernities (S N Eisenstadt, B Wittrock) reduces the West to one prototype but no primrose path.

In late November 2004 the Second Edmund Mokrzycki symposium took place, also this time in Warsaw, with a widening of the horizons, dealing with Building Democracy and Civil Society in “New” Europe. The enlargement with ten new countries admitted into post-Westphalian Europe is needless to say a major historical event. But Europe remains a political dwarf despite being an economic giant, as we used to say about West-Germany. EU as a European peace project is irreversibly successful, but has little political “clout” on the world scene, due to a lack of co-ordination and consensus. We have to learn to speak with one voice to the USA, as Altkanzler Helmut Schmidt says. This is evidently a remote goal.

But at least the EU is a good example of peaceful cooperation between sovereign nations, as Lord Dahrendorf once put it. This sovereignty is, however, limited by a number of problems that can only be solved on a pan-European/trans-national level, be it retirement schemes or security policy. The accession of ten new members meant both “problems and prospects”. For Poland evidently and very understandably NATO-

membership is more crucial than EU-membership. The Poles cannot realistically rely on the UN in case of military threat, which must remain an optional scenario, due to recent historical experiences.

Europe as a peace community is one central and probably strong concept. However, defining the boundaries and borders, there are “grey zones” both mentally and geographically. As Karl Schlögel writes “there are only 400 kilometres between Berlin and Lodz but the short trip passes a civilization border” (*Im Raume lesen wir die Zeit*: p 433, my translation). Carl Hanser 3-446-20382-8.

In a survey about a decade ago many Polish persons guessed that the distance between Warsaw and Berlin was 2000 kilometres. A few years ago the predominant guess was 1000 kilometres. The real distance is 550 kilometres. Borders are on ground and in minds. With the new Autobahn pass Poznan, Berlin is at least one hour closer by car, and soon two hours closer by train, when the transfer is speeded up to four hours instead of six.

Borders are an amorphous concept. They might denote an iron curtain with watch towers and land mines, or mental and invisible borders in the brains of people. Evidently borders within Europe are less relevant today than before *Die Wende* and the implosion of the Soviet empire. However, the question where Europe ends not only remains but gains new significance in the enlargement process. Moreover, some border regions, such as the Oder river become redefined and new options open. Religious borders and borders for family formation are merely examples of borders in Europe. The 1054 divide is arguably the most important one. There is a historical correlation between city culture, market capitalism and civic virtues. Eastwards the border is “floating”, less cities and even the architecture of the towns reflecting the old religious border between Orthodox and Catholic Churches. West of the divide there is not only a Church in the middle of the town but also a Rathaus/city hall.

There are no firm criteria for *Europeanness*. There are legacies from Greek Antiquity, or rather Hellenistic culture, Christianity and Enlightenment reason. There is no great European narrative.¹ It would be hard to imagine what such a narrative would contain, since Europe despite its advance in terms of overseas imperialism and spread of irreversible rationality (famous Weber/Bunyan “Iron cage”) always was split up in a huge number of smaller entities, often at war with each other. Only threats from the outside

¹ Jacques Le Goff: *The Birth of Europe* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005) covers its origin. Aetius and Jan Sobieski might be good candidates for becoming the “Wilhelm Tell” of Europe.

then constitute the European identity, with such way-stations in history as 490 B C, 451, 732, 1571, 1683, before Monnet and Schuman put a momentous snow-ball in rolling in 1950. It is a rather negative constitutive narrative, compared to the national ones, in the wake of Fichte throughout the 19th century.

The one who controls the past also controls the future. We find lots of retrospective presentist “Whiggism” in political history. Some myths are pure myths. The *Schmied aus Kochel* stands a statue in Kochel am See, representing Bavarian resistance to Austrian rule (“Lieber Bayerisch sterben als Kaiserlich werben”), but has in fact never existed, or at least that his historical authenticity is not proved.

One core element that matters is the degree of Western rationalism, how receptive the political culture is to Enlightenment reason. Even if the Jacobinian and Saint-Simonian social engineering and reformism which we find in redistributive mass democracies were not very “liberal” and instead imprinted by top-down rule by experts they nevertheless gained legitimacy from popular mass movements. In the lethargic cultures East of the 1054-divide independent social movements – what we normally speak of as civic associations in civil society – are largely missing and there are simply no efficiently implemented constitutionally defined rights and duties, and little pressure from below to achieve an efficient judiciary with secured individual rights. Instead we have widespread apathy and low participation and lack of trust.

Divides in political culture are not sharp ones. What we say today about for instance Russian nationalism could be useful characteristics of basic elements in the *deutscher Sonderweg* 150 years ago, such as historicist anti-Enlightenment Romanticism. “Canned” nationalism will have to “ache out”. It might even lead to the dissolution of the Russian Federation, that for instance the Komi Republic joins the EU. For recently independent central European nations the effects from both globalization and Europeanization also might lead to certain schizophrenic identity disorientation, as in the Czech Republic. Entering a union and losing a recent national independence is a lasting headache for Norway, so understandably also for the Czech Republic. Poland has lots of experience of a flexible Eastern border. Geography matters; flatland generates a security problem. No wonder that NATO is even more important than EU to a Polish patriot.

The European identity is merely yet another layer in a multi level government system and the states will be pretty busy also in the future. Despite losing ground as *the* unit, taken for granted by Weber and other nation builders, the state is busy taking care of more tasks than ever. Europe has also proved tolerant in accepting variations in speed, as

the cases of Denmark and the UK exemplify. With countries such as Poland and Greece inside we might feel stimulated, with impulses from “the identity giving other” already inside the walls. Poland might be predominantly Western in its orientation but as Edmund Mokrzycki emphasized yet being a mixed case with an Eastern element as part of its identity, and a “soft” border region with Polish irredenta in Belarus, Ukraine and Lithuania. There is in fact a considerable Polish minority also in Siberia. Moreover, in a long term elite perspective the cultivation of the Sarmatian myth represents an element of oriental romanticism. Greece and Cyprus are the only Orthodox countries within the EU. Enlargement means digestion problems. “New kids on the block” will result in growth of “sand in the machinery” and the European project will slow down. Europe will be “watered down” and lose its distinctiveness. Maybe Schumpeter’s words about communities having a tendency to define them selves will prove true. Turkey might choose to stay out, and the same probably goes for what remains of the Russian empire.

The relation to Russia nevertheless remains crucial. From a geo-political point of view Russia might wish to try to marginalize the Baltic nations and Poland from the rest of Europe. A Russia having lost decisive influence over Ukraine becomes a relatively marginal country in the North-Eastern periphery. To which extent will Russian irredenta in neighbouring countries generate conflicts in the future? We have to keep in mind that the relations between nations have no permanence. We also have to keep in mind that the Soviet Union is not quite gone from the scene; it is brain-dead but some of the members (KGB?) live on, as the Finlandian diplomat Max Jakobson points out.

However, despite some traits in Polish domestic political life – rhetoric about a “Fourth republic” and a certain idolization of Pilsudski – it is an obvious Polish national interest to promote a democratic development in Belarus and Ukraine.

The Russian case is enigmatic. Russia has served as “the identity giving other” and it is not by chance that both de Tocqueville and Weber were interested in both Russia and the USA, another identity giving other to the Europeans. However, Russia has also at times been a rather normal participant in the “European concert”. Catherine the Great was successful on the European scene and her diplomacy had huge effects on delayed German nation building, and its character as well.

Russia invests pride in carrying on the legacy from Byzantium, being the Third Rome, something which has been overshadowed by the Communist caesura. Whether Russia will remain on its own or be a part of a larger international community is a perennial and problematic question. So called convergence theories from the Cold war

period in a sense have been verified by events in recent decades, yet not excluding the relevance of the multiple Modernities approach, which in fact has considerable relevance also within core Europe (Liah Greenfeld).

How long lines in mental structures are reproduced in a way that is not easily caught by normal surveys appear to me as both crucial and difficult to understand. I did not understand how Lutheran I am until becoming a Polish resident.

Recent surveys indicate that attitudes among Russian youth are just or almost as modern and secularized as in the West. There are few reasons to doubt the reliability, but what about the validity?² The many Russian students I have met are highly cultured and less materialistic than Western students, more spiritual, in fact in many cases less interested in democracy than in religion. When they discuss democracy it often is understood as an alternative ideology and with very little of “organized scepticism”, of the kind we can afford in well established democracies and constitutional orders. However, the same to some extent is true of Germany, where democracy was implemented rather than achieved. It is easier for a Swede to air critical comments on the seamy sides of (mass) democracy, since a basically democratic order since long is taken for granted.

Religion should promote civility in societies with small and/or weak states. This is clear from de Tocqueville’s and Weber’s studies of the USA. Religion makes society hang together and tick. It might however also substitute civil society in low legitimacy regimes.

Recent surveys reportedly indicate that the divide in economic orientation is between Catholics and Orthodox rather than between Lutherans (evangelical) and the rest. This would confirm the momentous character of famous 1054-divide. Moreover, Inglehart’s recent works also indicates that religion is more alive than common theses about secularization and Modernization would suggest.

Boundaries and Growth to limits are main concerns. The momentous question is where Europe ends. What makes us believe that not only Central Europe but perhaps also Ukraine might enter the European Union while we are rather sceptical to the idea of Turkey or Russia as members? We cannot escape the problematic of the “identity giving

² James L Gibson has done surveys indicating that young Russians are as secularized as Western youth. However, Inglehart’s most recent works indicate a religious revival also in modern rational states and that Modernity and secularization do not have any simple correlation.

other”, despite the alleged racist bed-fellows of communitarian thinking, when applied to international relations. Actually Turkey before it became the sick man of Europe in several respects was rather modern and rational, with a central administration which in some respects answered to Weber’s ideal-type. And assumedly the Kurdish people don’t mind if the door for Turkey is kept a bit open, for the future.

One important issue is of course the capacity of EU to assimilate more new members, although a more time bound matter, about speed rather than borders.

In the original pan-European vision of Coudenhove-Kalergi huge parts of Africa, Indo-China and Indonesia were included, while the UK was left outside. Interestingly enough the Eastern “border” of his vision coincides with the famous 1054-divide. This line might however, be more precise than realities on the ground; otherwise we would expect Ukraine to split up, which does not appear as imminent. In fact we don’t have any firm criteria for measurement of Europeanness, perhaps except for the ones we read about in the “meta-texts” in Weber’s sociology of religion, for instance when he in “Zwischenbetrachtung” explains why the rational scientific experiment is a European phenomenon and not appeared in India or China despite advanced cultures. Of course it is possible to list a lot of “European” indicators. However, they tend to be increasingly universal, such as impersonal co-operations, in contrast to the Islamic world where trust and networking are based on personal relations instead of between enduring institutions. Business firms have thus difficulties to survive more than one generation. These originally Italian institutional inventions (such as the inc. or the *GmbH*) do not add a whole lot to our sense of specifically European mental belonging and we might end up with for instance Benjamin Franklin as the best of Europeans and talk about the Protestant ethic of the Japanese. Moreover, secular individual rational self-interest is a European Renaissance phenomenon, but can by its nature hardly generate a sense of community, despite Scottish Enlightenment offering some good hints how it might yet constitute a civil society (Mandeville, Smith).

European values as universal secular and Modern do indeed imply a teleological perspective, it only has to be made explicit, in order to avoid uncontrolled value intrusion and hidden agendas. We cannot say that the West is superior to the rest but it certainly has been the last half millennium.³

³ Multiple Modernity (Eisenstadt and Wittrock) has become a virulent paradigm and works by Immanuel Wallerstein and A G Frank go in same direction, in contrast to for instance Charles Murray.

Civil society is a recurrent theme in all Edmund Mokrzycki symposia. There are some puzzling contradictions. It might appear as legitimate to philosophize over a “European civil society” or even a global civil society, since there are European as well as global problems, such as climate and risk assessment, that attract the formation of popular mass movements. The very term civil society, however, implies in my mind something relatively small-scale, where social control and accountability can be naturally upheld. Civil society is *Gemeinschaft* rather than *Gesellschaft*. According to statistics suicide is far more common among people who live in communities with more than 10 000 inhabitants, in anonymous places where it is easy to feel marginalized and useless. The human being as “atomized” in large scale industrial society is an old theme, both in history and early Marxian thought. It might be a matter of proportion how large the city state from which we originally got the idea of civic and political engagement and community service ideally should be – but not very big. Civil society in a way is almost identical with local government. Self organization cannot efficiently be large scale. The magnitude should from this perspective be such that it is still possible to care about fellow man in a way which is not abstract.

Konrad Adenauer might have felt that the Asiatic steppes began at the height of Magdeburg and Charles de Gaulle felt that Europe stretched to the Ural Mountains. However, Novosibirsk appeared pretty “European” – of a sort – to me. And if we think about the so called Near East with old nations such as Armenia and Georgia we have to recognize that some of them would qualify in terms of religious culture while simultaneously having lots in common with central Asiatic clan-societies, with all of what that means in terms of autocracy and backwardness, citizens still being treated with unauthorized arbitrariness in what still appears as police states - in need of law and order. Armenia is particularly intriguing, with its huge “diaspora” and traditional dependence upon Russia for its national security. So paraphrasing Goethe: *Europa, wo liegt es? Ich weiß das Land nicht zu finden*. But I know that I felt a distinct European identity during my first sojourn in the USA.

It is telling that various “European” organizations have different members. UN’s ECE (Economic Commission for Europe) includes for instance Canada and Kazakhstan. The European Council in Straßburg has 44 member states. Russia and Turkey are both members. OSCE has 55 member states and include some central Asiatic republics; Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan are both members. Maybe the European football association (UEFA) provides a realistic answer, since this organization seemingly relates

to one of the few real existing European public spheres. UEFA has 52 members including Armenia, Azerbajdzjan, Georgia, Kazakhstan and Israel.

Reflections on European identity rarely reach any punchline. It merely sets an agenda. It is clear though that we have very little of a European myth of the sort that motivated nation-building in the 19th century.

This is no drawback, rather indicating that the dream of Europe as the “city on the hill” (Rifkin 2004) has relatively pragmatic recent motives and points in the direction of neither a federation or a Europe of nations but a new sort of confederation. The Californian sociologist Rogers Brubaker makes a useful distinction between on the one hand polity seeking and polity up-grading *vs* on the other hand policy based and nation shaping, depending upon if a people tries to establish a state or if a state tries to create a *demos* (“state for a people or people for a state”). These conceptual tools are useful more for understanding the past than the present. Europe doesn’t need any Vaclav Hanka, Macpherson or Elias Lönnroth, a European *demos* will take centuries and European identity might be tied to for instance citizenship. Ernest Renan predicted more than hundred years ago that the European nations will fade away and one European nation will emerge. I think that even EU enthusiastic optimists are sceptic. There will not very likely appear any European “Fichte”.

There are, however, some philosophers representing European values and concerns. Kant is the obvious case, since the whole EU project might arguably be seen as a following up of Kantian intentions. J S Mill deserves mentioning, with his stress on liberty and freedom of expression, in contrast to theocratic regimes.

The cultural map of Europe is, as we all know, far from homogeneous. Only in Moldavia we have 103 registered ethnicities. In early Modernity we find a strong correlation between state formation, taxation and national bible translations. The European project is different. Maybe it does not even need a well defined territory, in contrast to what Monsieur Villepin suggests?⁴

A topic with variations and a high omnipresence in all Edmund Mokrzycki symposia is the role of intellectuals, as public intellectuals, prophets and experts. Intellectuals tend to fail as politicians, ever since Plato in Syracuse. Alchibiades was no success either. Yet they of course have an intriguing relation to power, with variations, in reality and doctrine. This is another very Weberian theme. The classics might, however,

⁴ In a recent statement.

provide useful insights, lingering present day relevance. This is indicated from the fact that Machiavelli, Hobbes, Weber, Parsons and Habermas all work with the same basic problem and conceptualization, only gradually refined.

Intellectuals tend to be accommodating with worldly powers and contribute to ideology production and nation building; more rarely risk opposition and insurrection. The café literates (one of Weber's favourite terms) are value-rational and followed an ethic of conviction, thus as intellectuals rarely democratically responsible or accountable. However, in Poland Jacek Kuron and Adam Michnik were very and uniquely successful as "matchmakers", between workers and intellectuals, at the wharf in Danzig/Gdansk.⁵ This is, however, rather the exception confirming the rule. East European intellectuals betrayed the workers in Berlin 1953 and Warszawa 1956 and the workers were not responsive to follow the spell of self-appointed revolutionary leaders for a world revolution lead by students 1968. They were "bribed" to use an expression relating to analyses by Hobson, Lenin, Weber, Marcuse and Apel. So instead of the party the students became the *avant garde*, which had little credibility among class conscious proletarians.

Just as economists overestimate the role of economic factors and political scientists the role of political decision making, so scholars of intellectual history tend to overestimate the role of ideas. However, the long term victory of liberal constitutionalism over the Metternich system owes far more to Napoleon I than to any Enlightenment thinker; I hate to admit it but it is true.⁶

In a knowledge based society we have a problem with so-called low democratic agendas and democratic accountability, for instance in matters such as currency- and security-policy. One session will deal with *the relevance of the classics* for the understanding of present day problems of transformation processes and modalities of routes into Modernity. Max Weber was an Eurocentric close to the Orientalism Edward Said wrote about. Yet he remains at least relevant also for a comparative discourse on multiple Modernities, which might elucidate long term switches in political culture (*Daedalus*, Vol. 129. No 1, Winter 2000). I don't think Westerners can tell scholars in for

⁵ Jan Josef Lipski: *KOR. Workers' Defense Committee in Poland 1976-1981*. Univ of California Press, 1985.

⁶ Napoleon's letter to his brother Jerome when he becomes king of Westphalia is very telling, and astonishingly "liberal" (constitutional).

instance Kyrgyzstan which Dead White European Males they ought to read; rather they should be on call as “sparring partners”.

The 1054 divide is except for the obvious religious origin often discussed in terms of the lack of cities East of the divide. The European map gets “thinner” East of the Curzon line. Moreover, the cities we find have a special character. There is no central square with a city hall and a big clock, like we find in most other European cities. Cities are historically arrowheads in the direction of Modernity. “Stadtluft macht frei”, at least in areas where nature promotes feudal structures.

Religious attitudes, city culture, capitalism and civic virtues are interrelated variables.

However, the idea of democracy and civic virtues as correlated with city culture appears as odd to me, since in Sweden the fiction about our democratic roots are typically the independent peasant, free peasants as a recognized political estate, participating in the election of kings and decisions about taxes. The *Allthing* on Iceland is reportedly the oldest democratic parliament still in operation. Sweden, Iceland, and Switzerland are not primarily famous for their city culture. So even if the 1054 divide is telling about the difference between East and West it does not quite catch the core.

There is, however, an obvious thematic affinity between cities, religious cultures, markets and capitalist modernity.

According to Schumpeter capitalism tends to erode due to its being too successful, widening its borders beyond its natural limits. Maybe that’s indicative also for present European enlargement, which to some extent is a victory of liberal capitalism against “command economies”.

Probably the new countries were accepted into the union about ten or fifteen years (or more) prematurely, due to geopolitical reasons and thanks to American initiatives to enlarge NATO. However, history teaches us that momentous events often require some sort of dramatic impulse if they are to take place at all. *Contingency* is the term, or uncertainty under risk. The “right” moments are rare and seldom perfect. Politicians or people making politics have to catch them by the tail.

The European enlargement is a tempting alternative to aspiring countries. But how much can Europe digest; of partly alien cultures, including identity giving others?